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ABSTRACT
The Companies Act 71 of 2008 introduced into South African law a provision that, for 
the fi rst time, empowers the board of directors to remove a director from offi  ce. This 
article contends that the novel power conferred on the board to remove a director from 
offi  ce represents a fundamental shift in the balance of power between shareholders 
and directors. This article traces the historical division of powers between the board 
and shareholders in South African law, as well as in the United Kingdom, Australia and 
the United States of America. It also explores the historical reasons and underpinning 
philosophy as to why the shareholders acting in a shareholders’ meeting have been 
conferred the right, by means of an ordinary resolution, to remove directors from 
offi  ce in these jurisdictions. The article further explores the full implications of this 
new power granted under the Companies Act 71 of 2008. It is further signifi cant 
that section 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 represents the fi rst instance 
in South Africa’s company law history of statutorily conferring original powers of 
management on the board. It is argued that, despite the qualifi cations attached to 
it, this power of removal conferred on the board of directors has signifi cantly shifted 
 BA (cum laude) LLB (cum laude) LLM (cum laude) (Witwatersrand) LLD (Unisa). Senior 
Lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law, School of Law, University of South Africa, Attorney and 
Notary Public of the High Court of South Africa. This article is based on sections of the author’s 
LLD thesis.
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1 See s 71(5) of the Companies Act, which allows a director who has been removed from offi  ce by 
the board of directors, or a person who appointed that director as contemplated in s 66(4)(a)(i) of 
the Companies Act, to apply to a court, within twenty business days, to review the decision of the 
board.
2 These instances are where a shareholder or director has alleged that a director of the company has 
become ineligible, disqualifi ed, incapacitated, or has neglected or been derelict in the performance 
of the functions of director.
3 It is noteworthy that under s 219(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973, a court was empowered 
to make an order in certain circumstances directing that, for the period specifi ed in the order, a 
director could not, without the leave of the court, be a director or in any way be concerned with or 
take part in the management of a company. It was observed by Cilliers & Benade 2002: 126 that 
s 219 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 was in “disuse” in South Africa and that there were no 
reported cases regarding that provision.
the balance of power and dynamics not only between the board of directors and the 
shareholders, but also between the shareholders themselves, and even between 
the directors inter se. Some suggestions are made with regard to containing the shift 
in the balance of power between directors and shareholders.
Keywords: Division of powers between directors and shareholders; separation of 
ownership and control; balance of powers between directors and shareholders; 
removal of directors from offi  ce; corporate democracy
1 Introduction
The Companies Act 71 of  2008 (“the Companies Act”) came into force on 1 May 
2011. It introduced into South African law a provision that, for the fi rst time, empowers 
the board of directors to remove a director from offi  ce. This provision is contained 
in section 71(3), and it permits the board, on certain grounds and subject to a right of 
review,1 to remove a director from offi  ce in certain instances.2 Previously, under the 
repealed Companies Act 61 of 1973, only the shareholders acting in a shareholders’ 
meeting – and not the board of directors – were statutorily empowered to remove a 
director from offi  ce.3 This article contends that the novel power, conferred by section 
71(3) of the Companies Act on the board to remove a director from offi  ce, represents 
a fundamental shift in the balance of power between shareholders and directors. 
It is further signifi cant that section 66(1) of the Companies Act represents the fi rst 
instance in South Africa’s company law history of statutorily conferring original 
powers of management on the board.
This article traces the historical division of powers between the board and the 
shareholders in both South African law and the law of the United Kingdom (“UK”), 
which has always had a strong infl uence on South African company law. The legal 
position in Australia and in the United States of America (“USA”) is also discussed. In 
addition, this article explores the historical reasons and the underpinning philosophy 
39
4 Section 71(4)(b) of the Companies Act gives the director a reasonable opportunity to make a 
presentation, in person or through a representative, to the board meeting before the resolution for 
his or her removal is put to the vote by the board of directors.
5 Section 71(9) confers on a director, who is removed from offi  ce under s 71 of the Companies Act, 
a right to apply to a court for damages or other compensation for loss of offi  ce as a director, or for 
loss of any other offi  ce as a consequence of being removed as a director.
6 Automatic Self-cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 (CA); 
The Gramophone & Typewriter Ltd v Stanley [1908] 2 KB 89 (CA); Salmon v Quin and Axtens 
Ltd [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA); John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Peter Shaw & John Shaw [1935] 2 
KB 113 (CA) at 134; Scott v Scott [1943] 1 All ER 582 (ChD); Cape United Sick Fund Society v 
Forrest 1956 (4) SA 519 (A); Wessels & Smith v Vanugo Construction (Pty) Ltd 1964 (1) SA 635 
(O) at 637; Van Tonder v Pienaar 1982 (2) SA 336 (SE) at 341; Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v 
London & Suff olk Properties Ltd [1989] BCLC 100 (ChD); Ben-Tovim v Ben-Tovim 2001 (3) SA 
1074 (C) at 1085-1086; Massey v Wales (2003) 177 FLR 1 (Austl) at 12.
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as to why the shareholders, acting formally and collectively, were granted the right to 
remove one or more directors from offi  ce in these jurisdictions. The full implications 
of the new power conferred by the Companies Act are explored. It is argued that this 
power has signifi cantly shifted the balance of power and dynamics, not only between 
the board of directors and the shareholders acting in a shareholders’ meeting, but also 
between the shareholders themselves, and even between the directors inter se. Some 
suggestions are made with regard to containing the shift in the balance of power 
between directors and shareholders. While a director has a right to challenge his or 
her removal from offi  ce under section 71(4)(b)4 of the Companies Act or to apply, 
under section 71(5) of the Companies Act, for a review of the board’s decision to 
remove him or her from offi  ce, and further may have a right to claim damages or 
other compensation for loss of offi  ce under section 71(9) of the Companies Act,5 the 
focus of this article is not on these rights or remedies. Instead, the focus of this article 
is on the implications of the new power conferred on the board of directors to remove 
fellow directors from offi  ce.
2 The division of powers between directors and 
shareholders
The common-law division of powers between the board of directors and the 
shareholders in a general meeting (now called “a shareholders’ meeting”) must be 
distinguished from the statutory division of powers. This is discussed below.
2   1 The common-law division of powers
The powers of a company are divided between the board of directors and the 
shareholders in a shareholders’ meeting, and each organ has its own separate sphere 
of power.6 Until the end of the nineteenth century, it was generally accepted that 
the general meeting was the personifi cation of the company and the supreme organ 
40
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 7 Isle of Wight Railway Co v Tahourdin (1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA); Cilliers & Benade 2002: 85; Keay 
2007: 657; Davies & Worthington 2016: 358.
 8 Aickin 1967: 449.
 9 Davies & Worthington 2016: 358-359.
10 Aickin 1967: 449.
11 See Grantham 1998: 557, where these two vehicles are discussed.
12 Companies incorporated by a Royal Charter were known as “chartered companies”. The members 
contributed capital to form the companies’ “joint stock”, which was then managed by governors 
or directors appointed by the members (see French, Mayson & Ryan 2015: 7).
13 Parliament could create a body corporate by an enactment that referred specifi cally to that body 
corporate (French, Mayson & Ryan 2015: 7).
14 Grantham 1998: 557-558; French, Mayson & Ryan 2015: 7.
15 Grantham 1998: 558.
16 Ibid.
17 7 & 8 Vict c 110.
18 Kershaw 2012: 489. Registration took place in two stages, namely a provisional registration and a 
complete registration. The system was revised by the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856, which 
introduced a single-stage registration system (see French, Mayson & Ryan 2015: 8).
19 Grantham 1998: 558.
of the company, and that the directors were simply agents subject to the control of 
the company (i.e. the shareholders) in general meeting.7 Since the powers conferred 
upon the directors (as the agents) were thought of as having been conferred upon 
them by the shareholders (as the principals), it was deduced that the directors were 
subject to the control of the shareholders in general meeting.8 The implication was 
that the shareholders could at any time by ordinary resolution give the directors 
instructions on how they were to exercise their powers of management.9
This view of the superiority of the shareholders appears to be derived from the 
infl uence of elements of the law of partnership.10 Historically, in 1837, there were two 
principal vehicles used to conduct businesses on a large scale – the corporation and 
the joint stock company.11 The corporation existed in terms of a Royal Charter12 or an 
Act of Parliament13 and had a separate legal existence, while the joint stock company 
was simply a large partnership and did not enjoy a separate legal existence.14 Joint 
stock companies were economically the more important vehicle and courts applied 
the principles of partnership in regulating them.15 The application of partnership 
principles to joint stock companies, however, posed diffi  culties, because typical 
joint stock companies had hundreds of members, and it was clear that there was 
no personal relationship between the members, as is the case in a partnership.16 In 
order to address these problems, the Joint Stock Companies Act, 184417 was enacted. 
This was the fi rst Companies Act to provide for incorporation by registration, and it 
empowered the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies to incorporate a company whose 
documents were registered with him or her.18 This Act limited the size of partnerships, 
thus forcing large joint stock ventures to adopt a corporate form.19 Nevertheless, the 
courts continued to invoke partnership principles to resolve company law matters 
41
20 See, for example, In re Yenidje Tobacco Company Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 426 (CA), where the UK Court 
of Appeal, in deciding whether it was just and equitable that a private company be wound up, 
decided the matter on the basis of the principles that apply to a partnership. The court rationalised 
its approach on the ground that the company was in substance a partnership in the guise of a 
private company (at 431-432). See, further, Hill 2000: 42-43 for a discussion of the partnership 
model of the corporation in the nineteenth century.
21 Grantham 1998: 559; Hill 2000: 42-43.
22 (1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA).
23 Idem at 331-332.
24 Ibid.
25 See, further, Automatic Self-cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited v Cuninghame [1906] 
2 Ch 34 (CA) at 46, where the Chancery Division discussed s 90 of the Companies Clauses 
Consolidation Act of 1845.
26 (1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA).
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and a company was still regarded as a peculiar kind of partnership.20 The status of 
shareholders in company law at the time was that they were the ultimate proprietors 
of the company, and entailed that they had the right to manage the company and to 
have the company run for their exclusive benefi t.21
The superiority of the shareholders was enunciated in one of the fi rst cases 
dealing with the relative positions of the general meeting and the directors, 
namely Isle of Wight Railway Co v Tahourdin.22 In this case, the directors called 
a shareholders’ meeting on a requisition by the shareholders, but the notice of the 
meeting issued by the directors did not provide for all the objects of the requisitionists. 
The requisitionists notifi ed the directors that they would not attend the shareholders’ 
meeting called by the directors, and subsequently issued a notice calling their own 
meeting. The directors applied for an injunction restraining the requisitionists from 
calling their own meeting. The court a quo granted the injunction, but the UK Court 
of Appeal reversed the decision, and discharged the injunction. The latter court, per 
Cotton LJ, held that the company’s shareholders in general meeting “undoubtedly 
[had] a power to direct and control the board in the management of the aff airs of the 
company”.23
Isle of Wight Railway Co v Tahourdin24 concerned a company established 
by an Act of Parliament and subject to the provisions of the Companies Clauses 
Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict c 16). Section 90 of that Act provided that 
the directors had powers of management and superintendence of the aff airs of 
the company and that the exercise of such powers was subject to the control and 
regulation of any general meeting specially convened.25 It follows that the above-
quoted statement by Cotton LJ was a reference not to the powers of the general 
meeting, but to the powers of control expressly conferred on the shareholders by the 
Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845. Nevertheless, on the strength of Isle of 
Wight Railway Co v Tahourdin,26 the view was held that in relation to all companies, 
including those incorporated under the then Companies Act, 1862, the position was 
the same as that prevailing under the Company Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 and 
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27 See Aickin 1967: 451.
28 See Grantham 1998: 560-578, where the gradual attenuation of the rights of shareholders is traced 
in detail.
29 Automatic Self-cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 (CA); 
The Gramophone & Typewriter Ltd v Stanley [1908] 2 KB 89(CA); Salmon v Quin and Axtens 
Ltd [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA); John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Peter Shaw & John Shaw [1935] 2 
KB 113 (CA) at 134; Scott v Scott [1943] 1 All ER 582 (ChD); Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v 
London & Suff olk Properties Ltd [1989] BCLC 100 (ChD); Goldberg 1970: 177; Blackman 1975: 
286; Sullivan 1977: 569.
30 (1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA).
31 See Cilliers & Benade 2002: 85.
32 [1906] 2 Ch 34 (CA).
that a company in a general meeting had the power to direct and control the board of 
directors in relation to the conduct of the company’s aff airs.27
After the nineteenth century, however, there was a fundamental shift in the 
perception of the relationship between the general meeting and the directors. 
The notions that shareholders had the right to override decisions of management, 
or that the company was conducted for the exclusive benefi t of the shareholders, 
were rejected.28 The general rule developed to rather provide that, unless expressly 
empowered to do so by the constitution of the company, the shareholders in general 
meeting could not control the directors’ exercise of their powers, nor exercise the 
powers conferred on the directors.29 Insofar as Isle of Wight Railway Co v Tahourdin30 
held that the directors are bound by the instructions of the shareholders’ meeting in 
carrying out their functions, this decision was no longer regarded as good law.31
In the seminal case of Automatic Self-cleansing Filter Syndicate Company 
Limited v Cuninghame,32 the question before the UK Court of Appeal was whether 
the shareholders acting in a shareholders’ meeting had the power to direct the course 
of action to be pursued by the directors (in casu, that certain assets of the company 
be sold) or whether the directors could refuse to do what the shareholders in a 
shareholders’ meeting directed them to do. The constitution of the Automatic Self-
cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited empowered the company to sell its 
undertaking to another company having similar objects. The directors of the former 
company were empowered to sell or otherwise deal with any of the company’s 
property on such terms as they might think fi t. A resolution was passed by the 
shareholders of the company for the sale of the company’s assets on certain terms 
to a new company formed for the purpose of acquiring such assets, and directing 
the directors to carry the sale into eff ect. The directors were of the opinion that the 
sale of the company’s assets on the proposed terms would not benefi t the company. 
The directors accordingly refused to carry the sale into eff ect. The UK Court of 
Appeal held that, on the construction of the constitution of the company itself, which 
provided that the management of the business and control of the company was vested 
43
33 Idem at 45.
34 (1883) 25 ChD 320 (CA).
35 Automatic Self-cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited v Cuninghame [1906] 2   Ch   34 (CA) 
at 46.
36 Idem at 42-43.
37 [1908] 2 KB 89 (CA) at 98.
38 [1906] 2 Ch 34 (CA).
39 The Gramophone & Typewriter Ltd v Stanley [1908] 2 KB 89 (CA) at 105-106.
40 Idem at 106.
41 [1909] 78 LJ Ch 46 (ChD).
42 Idem at 49.
43 [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA) at 319.
44 [1908] 2 KB 89 (CA) at 106.
45 [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA) at 319-320.
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in the directors, the directors could not be compelled to comply with the resolution 
of the shareholders.33 The UK Court of Appeal distinguished this case from Isle of 
Wight Railway Co v Tahourdin34 on the basis that the Companies Clauses Act, 1845 
was not applicable to the case before it and held that it was therefore not bound by 
the dictum of this case.35 The court emphatically rejected the notion that directors are 
merely agents of the general meeting, susceptible to direction by the general meeting 
on any matter.36
In The Gramophone & Typewriter Ltd v Stanley,37 the UK Court of Appeal 
approved the dictum in Automatic Self-cleansing Filter Syndicate Company Limited 
v Cuninghame38 and asserted that shareholders could not, even by a majority at a 
general meeting, interfere with the exercise of powers placed in the hands of the 
directors by the constitution of the company. Buckley LJ stressed that directors 
are not servants to obey directions given by the shareholders and that they are not 
agents appointed by and bound to serve the shareholders as their principals.39 To the 
contrary, Buckley LJ held that directors are persons who may, by the regulations, 
be entrusted with the control of the business and who may be dispossessed of that 
control only by the alteration of the company’s constitution.40
Despite these authorities, the matter was not fully settled. In Marshall’s Valve 
Gear Co Ltd v Manning, Wardle & Co Ltd,41 a diff erent view was adopted. The 
Chancery Division, per Neville J, asserted that the prevailing principle was that, 
in the absence of any contract to the contrary, the majority of the shareholders in 
a company had the ultimate control of its aff airs and could assert their rights in 
a shareholders’ meeting.42 In spite of this judgement, the UK Court of Appeal in 
Salmon v Quin and Axtens Ltd,43 reverted to the position that it had previously held 
and adopted the view enunciated in The Gramophone & Typewriter Ltd v Stanley,44  
namely that directors are persons who may – by the regulations – be entrusted with 
the control of the business and who may be dispossessed of that control only by the 
alteration of the company’s constitution. The UK Court of Appeal, in Salmon v Quin 
and Axtens Ltd,45 stated that any other construction would be disastrous, because it 
44
REHANA CASSIM
46 [1909] 78 LJ Ch 46 (ChD).
47 [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA).
48 [1906] 2 Ch 34 (CA).
49 [1908] 2 KB 89 (CA). See Salmon v Quin and Axtens Ltd [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA) at 315.
50 See Aickin 1967: 458.
51 [1935] 2 KB 113 (CA) at 134. See James North (Zimbabwe) (Pvt) Ltd v Mattinson 1990 (2) SA 
229 (ZH) at 237, where the Zimbabwe High Court approved of this dictum.
52 [1943] 1 All ER 582 (ChD).
53 Idem at 584-585. For an analysis of the relationship between the board of directors and the general 
meeting and for a defence of the dictum in Marshall’s Valve Gear Co Ltd v Manning, Wardle & 
Co Ltd [1909] 78 LJ Ch 46(ChD), see Goldberg 1970: 177 and Sullivan 1977: 569. See, also, 
Blackman 1975: 286-290 for a further analysis of the distribution of powers in a company.
54 [1974] AC 821 (PC) at 837.
55 [1989] BCLC 100 (ChD) at 106.
“might lead to an interference by a bare majority very inimical to the interests of the 
minority who had come into the company on the footing that the business should be 
managed by the board of directors”. The dictum in Marshall’s Valve Gear Co Ltd v 
Manning, Wardle & Co Ltd46 was not referred to in Salmon v Quin and Axtens Ltd,47 
but counsel for the plaintiff  criticised the latter decision as being inconsistent with 
the principles established in Automatic Self-cleansing Filter Syndicate Company 
Limited v Cuninghame48 and The Gramophone & Typewriter Ltd v Stanley.49
Thereafter, the relationship between the board of directors and the general 
meeting was regarded as having been settled by the UK Court of Appeal.50 The 
relationship between directors and shareholders is succinctly expressed by the UK 
Court of Appeal in John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Peter Shaw & John Shaw51 as 
follows:
If powers of management are vested in the directors, they and they alone can exercise 
these powers. The only way in which the general body of the shareholders can control the 
exercise of the powers vested by the articles in the directors is by altering their articles or, 
if opportunity arises under the articles, by refusing to re-elect the directors of whose actions 
they disapprove.
In Scott v Scott,52 the Chancery Division said that the division of powers between 
the shareholders and directors is important even in the case of family companies. 
That court held that a resolution of shareholders purporting to interfere with the 
management of directors was invalid.53 The Privy Council emphasised in Howard 
Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd54 that the majority of shareholders cannot control 
directors in the exercise of their management powers while they remain in offi  ce. In 
Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v London & Suff olk Properties Ltd,55 the Chancery 
Division held that the jurisdiction to conduct the business of the company was vested 
in the board of directors, and that the shareholders in a shareholders’ meeting could 
not intervene in such matters.
45
56 1956 (4) SA 519 (A). The members of the Cape United Sick Fund Society had requested the 
board of management of the society to convene a special general meeting to consider certain 
resolutions that had the eff ect of conferring power on a body other than the board of management, 
of empowering a body other than the board of management to obtain legal advice, and of 
suspending the payment of honoraria to members of the board of management. The board of 
management refused to convene such a meeting. The members of the society issued a declaration 
claiming an order directing the board to convene such a meeting or alternatively authorising the 
members to call the meeting in the name of the society. The society and the members of the board 
excepted to the declaration as disclosing no cause of action in that under the society’s constitution 
it would not be competent for the special general meeting to pass the proposed resolution, or, if 
the resolutions were passed, they would have no force or eff ect. The Appellate Division held that 
all the resolutions proposed to be moved would be ultra vires the constitution of the society, and 
that the board was accordingly entitled to refuse to convene the meeting.
57 [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA) at 319.
58 [1935] 2 KB 113 (CA) at 134. See Cape United Sick Fund Society v Forrest 1956 (4) SA 519 (A) 
at 540.
59 1964 (1) SA 635 (O) at 637.
60 [1943] 1 All ER 582 (ChD).
61 Wessels & Smith v Vanugo Construction (Pty) Ltd 1964 (1) SA 635 (O) at 637.
62 1982 (2) SA 336 (SE) at 341.
63 [1935] 2 KB 113 (CA) at 134.
64 2000 JDR 0187 (SCA).
65 [1935] 2 KB 113 (CA) at 134.
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The distribution of power between the board of directors and the shareholders 
in South African law has been infl uenced by the position adopted by the UK courts. 
For instance, with regard to a friendly association endowed with legal personality 
under the common law, the Appellate Division in Cape United Sick Fund Society 
v Forrest56 approved and applied the principle of the division of powers between 
managing bodies and a meeting of members. The Appellate Division further 
approved the principles established in Salmon v Quin and Axtens Ltd57 and John 
Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Peter Shaw & John Shaw.58 In Wessels & Smith v Vanugo 
Construction (Pty) Ltd,59 the Orange Free State High Court stated, with reference to 
and with approval of the decision in Scott v Scott,60 that it had already been held that 
an article in the constitution of a company, which provided that the business of the 
company shall be managed by the directors, entailed that the entire management of 
the company rests solely in the hands of the directors. The court consequently stated 
that any resolution by the company in a shareholders’ meeting purporting to interfere 
with this management, was invalid.61 In Van Tonder v Pienaar,62 the South-Eastern 
Cape High Court relied on and agreed with John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Peter 
Shaw & John Shaw63 that if powers of management are vested in the directors, they 
and they alone can exercise those powers.
More recently, in LSA UK Ltd (formerly Curtainz Ltd) v Impala Platinum 
Holdings Ltd,64 the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) affi  rmed the general position 
enunciated in John Shaw & Sons (Salford) Ltd v Peter Shaw & John Shaw.65 The 
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66 LSA UK Ltd (formerly Curtainz Ltd) v Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd 2000 JDR 0187 (SCA) at 38.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 2001 (3) SA 1074 (C) at 1085-1086.
70 See art 83 of Table A (Regulations for Management of a Company Limited by Shares) contained 
in Schedule 1 of the Companies Act 46 of 1926.
court affi  rmed that the board of directors and the general meeting are both organs 
of the company, each having its own original powers, and that the directors do not 
receive their powers as agents of the company.66 Accordingly, the court held, in 
the absence of a contrary provision in the constitution of the company, that even 
a unanimous resolution of the general meeting does not override the directors’ 
powers.67 The SCA said that it is possible for the board and the general meeting to 
have concurrent powers, but stated that courts are disinclined to treat managerial and 
executive powers as concurrent and that, unless the constitution provides otherwise, 
these powers are exercisable exclusively by the directors.68 In Ben-Tovim v Ben-
Tovim,69 the Cape High Court acknowledged that the “pendulum of the division of 
powers between the general meeting and the board of directors has through the years 
swung from the general meeting as the supreme organ to prominence of the articles 
of association”.
2   2 The statutory division of powers
Under neither the Companies Act 46 of 1926,70 nor the Companies Act 61 of 1973, 
did directors have original powers. Their powers were delegated to them by the 
shareholders in the then articles of association of the company. A typical provision in 
the articles of association under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 adopted article 59 of 
Table A (articles for a public company having a share capital) or article 60 of Table 
B (articles for a private company having a share capital), which reads as follows:
The business of the company shall be managed by the directors who may pay all expenses 
incurred in promoting and incorporating the company, and may exercise all such powers 
of the company as are not by the Act, or by these articles, required to be exercised by the 
company in general meeting, subject to these articles, to the provisions of the Act, and to such 
regulations, not inconsistent with the aforesaid articles or provisions, as may be prescribed 
by the company in general meeting, but no regulation prescribed by the company in general 
meeting shall invalidate any prior act of the directors which would have been valid if such 
regulation had not been made.
It is evident from the above provision that, under the Companies Act 61 of 1973, 
the power to manage the company’s aff airs had to be delegated to the board of 
directors by the shareholders in general meeting or by the articles of association of 
the company. If no powers were granted to the board of directors by the articles of 
47
71 See Kershaw 2012: 191-192.
72 Pretorius v PB Meat (Pty) Ltd [2013] ZAWCHC 89 para 25. See, further, on s 66(1) of the 
Companies Act: Kaimowitz v Delahunt 2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC) paras 12-13; Delport 2011: 
250(1)–262(5); Havenga 2013: 262; Esser & Delport 2016: 8-10; and Oosthuizen & Delport 
2017: 244.
73 [2013] ZAWCHC 89 para 25.
74 [2014] JOL 32101 (WCC) para 31.
75 2017 (3) SA 201 (WCC) para 12.
76 Havenga 2013: 262.
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association, the board would be powerless to act and the company could act only 
through its shareholders.71
Section 66(1) of the current Companies Act represents a fundamental change in 
the philosophy of the balance of power between the directors and shareholders. The 
section provides as follows:
The business and aff airs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of its board, 
which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the 
company, except to the extent that this Act or the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation 
provides otherwise.
With the enactment of section 66(1) of the Companies Act, original power to manage 
the business and aff airs of the company has, for the fi rst time, been statutorily 
granted to the board of directors.72 As the Western Cape High Court in Pretorius v PB 
Meat (Pty) Ltd,73 Navigator Property Investments (Pty) Ltd v Silver Lakes Crossing 
Shopping Centre (Pty) Ltd74 and Kaimowitz v Delahunt75 affi  rmed, in terms of the 
Companies Act, the “ultimate” power to manage the aff airs of a company resides with 
the board of directors, and not with the shareholders (unless otherwise provided in 
the Companies Act or the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company). Since the 
board’s power of management is derived from statute and not from the constitution 
of the company, as was previously the case, it is now to a lesser extent subject to 
shareholder control.76
In contrast, the UK’s Companies Act, 2006 does not contain a provision 
conferring management power on the board of directors. Instead, the distribution 
of decision-making power between the board of directors and the shareholders is 
determined by the constitution of the company. Article 3 of the Model Articles for 
Private Companies Limited by Shares and article 3 of the Model Articles for Public 
Companies state that “[s]ubject to the articles, the directors are responsible for the 
management of the company’s business, for which purpose they may exercise all 
the powers of the company”. Article 4 of both Model Articles for private and public 
companies confers on shareholders the power, “by special resolution, to direct the 
directors to take, or refrain from taking, specifi ed action”. In UK company law, 
the regulation of the internal aff airs of the company by means of rules laid down 
in the company’s constitution is known as the contractarian model, as “English 
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model companies” or as the “memorandum and articles” model of companies.77 
The constitution of this type of corporation is regarded as a contract between all 
of the shareholders and the company itself.78 The fact that it is left to the articles 
of association to determine the distribution of decision-making power between the 
board of directors and the shareholders, indicates that, in the UK, the originating 
power of the company lies with the shareholders acting in general meeting, and 
not with the directors, and it is, accordingly, a shareholder-centric approach.79 The 
directors are not granted managerial powers by statute, but such powers must come 
from the shareholders by way of a delegation of authority.80 The shareholders may 
alter the initial distribution of power, which was delegated to the board of directors 
by the articles of association, by passing a special resolution to amend such articles 
of association.81 This swings the balance of power in the UK in favour of the 
shareholders, rather than of the board of directors.
The South African Companies Act of 2008 has clearly moved away from the 
approach regarding the distribution of power to the board of directors adopted by 
the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and by the UK. Instead, it now follows the approach 
adopted in the USA. A long-standing principle of corporate law in the USA is that 
the power to manage the company is conferred on the board of directors by statute. 
Section 8.01(b) of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act of 1984 (“MBCA”) 
states that corporate powers are exercised by, or under the authority of, the board 
of directors, and that the business and aff airs of the corporation are managed by, or 
under the direction of, its board of directors. This approach is director-centric and is 
known as the division of powers model, because the statute explicitly divides powers 
between shareholders and directors.82 This approach does, however, retain fl exibility 
in that default rules may be changed by the company’s constitution.83 Likewise, 
section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (Title 8, Chapter 1 of the 
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Delaware Code) (“DGCL”) states that the business and aff airs of every corporation 
shall be managed by, or under the direction of, a board of directors (except as otherwise 
provided in its certifi cate of incorporation). In Aronson v Lewis,84 the Supreme Court 
of Delaware emphasised that a cardinal precept of the DGCL is that directors, rather 
than shareholders, manage the business and aff airs of the corporation.
Under the Corporations Act 2001 of Australia, the management of the business 
of a company is a matter for the company’s directors, and shareholders do not 
possess the power to make management decisions.85 Section 198A(1) of that Act 
states that the “business of a company is to be managed by or under the direction of 
the directors”.86 It should be noted, however, that section 198A is a replaceable rule, 
meaning that it may be ousted or modifi ed by the constitution of the company.87 In 
terms of section 198A(2) of the same Act, the powers of the directors may be curtailed 
by the Australian Corporations Act of 2001 or by the company’s constitution.88
In accordance with the approach adopted by section 8.01(b) of the MBCA 
and section 198A(2) of the Australian Corporations Act of 2001, the powers 
conferred on directors by section 66(1) of the South African Companies Act of 
2008 may be curtailed by the latter Act or by the Memorandum of Incorporation 
of the company. The shareholders may amend the Memorandum of Incorporation 
by means of a special resolution or by means of any other requirements set out 
therein.89 The shareholders are thus not without power and are able to curtail the 
powers of the board of directors in the Memorandum of Incorporation, and to amend 
it by means of a special resolution or by complying with any other requirements 
set out in the Memorandum of Incorporation regarding its amendment. There are, 
however, limitations to the exercise of this power by the shareholders in that (i) a 
special resolution to amend the Memorandum of Incorporation must be proposed 
by shareholders entitled to exercise at least 10 per cent of the voting rights that may 
be exercised on the resolution;90 (ii) the threshold for passing a special resolution 
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may be increased in terms of section 65(10) of the Companies Act;91 and (iii) in 
terms of section 16(2) of the Companies Act, more onerous requirements to amend 
a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation than that set out in section 16(1)(c)(i) 
may be specifi ed in the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation. Thus, while the 
shareholders have the power to curtail the powers of the board of directors in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation and to amend the Memorandum of Incorporation in 
order to do so, there are some important limitations to the exercise of this power by 
the shareholders.
To summarise, since the Companies Act of 2008 determines that the power to 
manage the business and aff airs of the company is derived from statute and not from 
the constitution of the company and that this power no longer needs to be delegated 
to the board of directors by the shareholders, the power of the directors is subject to 
shareholder control to a much lesser extent than was the case under the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973. The new Companies Act has moved away from the contractarian 
model adopted in the UK, to the division-of-powers model adopted in the USA and 
Australia in that the allocation of powers is sourced in legislation, save where it is 
changed by the constitution of the company. It is evident that under the Companies 
Act, the balance of power has shifted away from the shareholders and that it now lies 
in favour of the board of directors.
3 The separation of ownership and control
In many small private companies the directors and the shareholders are often the 
same persons. In larger companies though, as famously documented by Berle and 
Means in their landmark study in 1932,92 ownership and control of companies do 
not vest in the same persons. Berle and Means argue that ownership and control of 
a large company are split, in that the control of a company vests in the hands of the 
managers of the company – being the board of directors – while “ownership” of the 
company vests in the shareholders.93 The eff ect of the split in ownership and control 
is that a large body of shareholders has been created who exercise virtually no control 
over the wealth that they have contributed to the enterprise, while the ownership 
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interest held by the controlling group, being the directors, is only a decidedly small 
fraction of the total ownership of the company.94
It is important to note at the outset that it is misleading to describe the shareholders 
as the “owners” of the corporation. Shareholders do not “own” a company; instead, 
they own shares in the company, which gives them certain legal rights. The property 
and assets of the company belong to the company itself and not to the shareholders.95 
While a shareholder may be fi nancially interested in the success or failure of a 
company because he or she is entitled to a share in the distribution of the surplus 
assets when a company is liquidated, this does not mean that he or she has any legal 
right or title to any assets of the company.96 It may be that in small private companies 
where one shareholder or a restricted number of shareholders hold the shares in 
the company, such shareholders would exercise more control over the company 
compared to a public company, in which the shareholding is widely dispersed. It 
would nonetheless be both factually and legally incorrect to refer even to these 
shareholders as “owners of a company”.97 The “shareholder/ownership” model was 
the basis of Berle and Means’ work and much of the work that succeeded it, and 
continues to command much support in practice.98 For purposes of this article, the 
metaphor of shareholders as the “owners” of the company will be used. However, 
one must bear in mind that this metaphor is not legally or factually accurate, because 
the owners of the capital of the company are not the owners of the company itself.
For decades, large public companies have issued increasing numbers of shares 
in order to raise capital for growth and expansion. This has had the eff ect of causing 
fragmentation of share ownership in public companies. Shareholders in large public 
companies have also become widely dispersed or geographically scattered. In 
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general, the larger the company, the greater the probability that its ownership will be 
diff used among a multitude of individuals.99 Thus ownership and wealth have come 
to reside less and less in one person.100
As Berle and Means explain, ownership of wealth without appreciable control, 
and control of wealth without appreciable ownership, appear to be the logical 
outcome of corporate development.101 This has the eff ect that no single shareholder 
or group of shareholders is able to exercise eff ective control over the directors. In a 
large public company, and particularly in a listed company, each shareholder usually 
owns only a minute fraction of the shares in a company, which means that no one 
shareholder is in a position to exert control of the company by way of voting in 
shareholders’ meetings.102 Thus the power and responsibility of ownership is in eff ect 
transferred to a separate group who, in reality, have true control.103
The separation of ownership and control creates a potential divergence between 
the interests of the shareholders and the directors, and leads to the problem that the 
directors do not necessarily act in the best interests of the shareholders when they 
manage a company.104 This goal-divergence problem is referred to as the “agency 
problem” or as “agency costs”.105 In large companies, the principals are not capable 
of exercising day-to-day control over the aff airs of the company. Accordingly, they 
appoint directors to act as their agents, but, because the ownership of a company 
is separated from its control, the interests of the principals and the agents are not 
identical. The directors may well pursue activities that benefi t themselves rather than 
the shareholders of the company. In order to limit the activities of the agent that serve 
to favour his or her own interests, the principal will establish appropriate incentives 
for the agent, and incur monitoring costs, which are aimed at limiting the aberrant 
activities of the agent.106
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The concept of separation of ownership and control, as advocated by Berle and 
Means in 1932, has been strongly infl uential in analysing the structure and inner 
workings of a company. However, in modern times, certain qualifi cations to this 
concept may be required. For instance, it may be too simplistic to assume that there 
is necessarily complete separation of ownership and control in all large public 
companies, such as where the founders of a company retain a large proportion of 
the company’s share capital after the company has been listed and are thus still able 
to exercise eff ective control over the company in their capacity as shareholders.107 
Herman argues that Berle and Means overstated the loss of power of the shareholders 
and the separation and discretion of managers.108
A further qualifi cation to Berle and Means’ thesis is the fact that not all 
shareholders today are small private investors. There has been a signifi cant increase 
in the number of institutional investors. Institutional investors may hold a suffi  ciently 
large shareholding in a company to be able to infl uence directors directly, and 
therefore to have a potentially strong monitoring role.109 If institutional investors 
were to act together and share agency costs, they would be a powerful monitor of 
the performance of directors.110 Nonetheless, institutional investors may not be as 
infl uential as one might hope, because, in an attempt to diversify their share portfolio 
and obtain quick fi nancial gains, institutional shareholders generally own shares in a 
large number of companies and are thus not able to wield real control in any one of 
the companies in which they invest.111
It must be conceded that shareholders in modern times are no longer as 
powerless as they were during the time of Berle and Means. For instance, individual 
shareholders in the 1930s did not have an instantaneous means of communication 
with each other, but in present times, with modern technology, shareholders are 
able to communicate with each other faster, easier and with less expense, and 
consequently to act together to exert infl uence on boards of directors.112 For example, 
under section 63(2) of the Companies Act, unless prohibited by its Memorandum of 
Incorporation, a company may provide for a shareholders’ meeting to be conducted 
entirely by electronic communication or for one or more shareholders or proxies for 
shareholders to participate by electronic communication in a shareholders’ meeting 
that is being held in person. Under section 61(10) of the Companies Act, every 
shareholders’ meeting of a public company must be reasonably accessible within 
South Africa for electronic participation by shareholders in the manner contemplated 
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in section 63(2) of the same Act, irrespective of whether the meeting is held in South 
Africa or elsewhere.113
The qualifi cations to the concept of separation of ownership and control 
as propounded by Berle and Means do not detract from the fact that, in general, 
and particularly in large companies, there still remains a separation of ownership 
and control between directors and shareholders. The degree of separation of the 
ownership and control between directors and shareholders varies from company to 
company.
4 Shareholders’ power to remove directors from offi  ce
In 1945, the Cohen Committee recommended that shareholders be given “greater 
powers to remove directors with whom they are dissatisfi ed”.114 This recommendation 
formed the underlying rationale of section 184 of the UK’s Companies Act, 1948.115 
The purpose of that provision was to strengthen shareholder control over management 
by conferring the power on the shareholders to remove a director from offi  ce by 
means of an ordinary resolution, notwithstanding any provisions in the constitution 
of the company.116
In a similar vein, in order to promote the policy of giving shareholders a greater 
say in the management of a company and to increase the control that shareholders 
could exercise over directors, section 69ter of the SA Companies Act 46 of 1926, in 
1952, in an amendment to that Act, conferred on shareholders the power to remove 
directors from a company.117 This latter provision was based on section 184 of the 
UK’s Companies Act, 1948.118 The SA Companies Act 61 of 1973, in section 220, 
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likewise conferred on shareholders the power to remove directors from a company, 
notwithstanding the provisions of the company’s memorandum and articles of 
association.119
In line with the recommendation of conferring greater powers on shareholders to 
remove directors with whom they are dissatisfi ed, the Supreme Court of Delaware in 
Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co120 stated that “[i]f the stockholders are displeased 
with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy 
are at their disposal to turn the board out”. The same court likewise stated in Aronson 
v Lewis121 that a stockholder is not powerless to challenge director action that results 
in harm to the corporation, and that the machinery of corporate democracy is a potent 
tool to redress the conduct of a “torpid or unfaithful management”.
Furthermore, the shareholders’ power to remove directors of a company 
enhances the ability of shareholders to control the disposition of their investment in 
the company.122 Additionally, it serves to enhance the accountability of directors. If 
shareholders have removal rights, directors would know that the shareholders may 
exercise their right to remove them from offi  ce if they behave in an incompetent 
manner or engage in self-serving, opportunistic behaviour.123 Since directors exercise 
signifi cant discretion over the aff airs of the company, it is important for them to 
have a reason to serve the interests of shareholders.124 The threat of removal by the 
shareholders would provide directors with such a strong reason to serve the interests 
of the shareholders.125
In light of the eff ects of the separation of power and control in a company, the 
power granted to the shareholders to remove directors is a critical tool in the hands 
of shareholders; it strikes a balance between the directors’ powers of management 
on the one hand and the shareholders’ powers of control on the other.126 If the 
shareholders are displeased with the manner in which the company is being run, they 
have the right to exercise their ultimate power of control by removing the directors 
from offi  ce.127 Therefore, the power conferred on shareholders to remove directors 
serves to balance the attenuated power of control of shareholders with the power of 
directors to manage the company, and constitutes a form of corporate democracy.128 
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The conferral of this power is rooted in the separation of ownership and control 
(particularly in public companies) and, provided that shareholders choose to exercise 
these powers, they are of fundamental importance in the control of a company.
It is evident from the above discussion that the underpinning philosophy of our 
corporate law regime is that the shareholders’ right to remove directors from offi  ce 
is both elementary and necessary, and that it is a key provision of modern company 
law.129 Section 71(1) of the Companies Act confers this right on shareholders by stating 
that a director may be removed by an ordinary resolution adopted at a shareholders’ 
meeting by the persons entitled to exercise voting rights in an election of that director. 
No reasons are required for the removal of a director by the shareholders. This power 
granted to shareholders in terms of this provision applies despite anything to the 
contrary in a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation or rules, or in any agreement 
between a company and a director, or between any shareholders and a director.
5 Impact of the board’s power to remove a director from 
offi  ce
The conferral of the removal power on the board of directors has had an impact not 
only on the shareholders of a company, but also on the board of directors itself. The 
extent of this impact is discussed below.
5   1 Impact on the shareholders of the company
Even though the Companies Act has now also granted the right to remove directors 
from offi  ce to the board of directors, this does not mean that the power of removal has 
been withdrawn from the shareholders. Section 71(1) of the Companies Act preserves 
the right of shareholders to remove directors from offi  ce. Accordingly, under the 
same Act, the right to remove a director is exercisable by both the shareholders and 
the directors. This accords with the reasoning in the US case of Auer v Dressel,130 
where the New York Court of Appeals held that even if the board of directors of 
a company is authorised to remove any director, this would not be an abdication 
by the shareholders of their inherent right to remove the directors, but rather, that 
it provides an additional method of removing the directors. Were this not so, the 
court said, the shareholders might fi nd themselves without an eff ective remedy in 
a case where a majority of the directors were accused of wrongdoing and would be 
unwilling to remove themselves from offi  ce.131
A few examples when it may be benefi cial for the board of directors to exercise 
the power of removal, are:
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 ● When the shareholders who wish to remove an incompetent or miscreant 
director from offi  ce do not have a suffi  cient majority to remove that director 
from offi  ce.132
 ● When the shareholders do not wish to remove a particular director from offi  ce 
despite his or her wrongdoing, because they believe that he or she is bringing in 
profi ts for the company, when in fact such director is a liability and is exposing 
the company to potential legal action.
 ● When the shareholders fail to remove a director from offi  ce because they are 
not convinced by the reasons advanced by the board of directors to remove the 
particular director from offi  ce.
 ● When the board of directors suspects that a director is passing on confi dential 
information to a competitor, or is engaged in ethically questionable activity 
that will refl ect poorly on the company, and they do not wish to disclose to 
the shareholders such wrongdoing by one of their members for fear that this 
may expose the company to potential legal action.133 Such matters ought to 
be disclosed to the shareholders, but the board may be concerned that if they 
disclose this information to the shareholders the latter may institute legal action 
against them.134
Despite the merits of conferring the power of removal on the board of directors, such 
conferment is not consistent with the above-mentioned rationale of originally granting 
shareholders the right to remove directors, namely to give the shareholders more 
power over the directors because the separation of ownership and control resulted in 
attenuated shareholder control. As discussed earlier, conferring on shareholders the 
power to remove directors from offi  ce gives directors a strong incentive to focus on 
the interests of shareholders. One other eff ect of conferring the power of removal on 
the board of directors, is that directors would be inclined to focus on the interests of 
the board of directors as well, which may have the eff ect of diluting their incentive 
to focus only on the interests of the shareholders and to follow the line of action 
preferred by the shareholders.
In terms of section 66(4)(b) of the Companies Act, the Memorandum of 
Incorporation of a profi t company (other than a state-owned company) must provide 
for the election by shareholders of at least 50 per cent of the directors and 50 per 
cent of any alternate directors. The shareholders therefore have a right to appoint at 
least half of the directors on the board. As a general rule, shareholders may vote for 
a director in their own interests; they are under no obligation or duty to choose the 
person most suitable to be a director.135 This is because it is well established that a 
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shareholder’s right to vote is a proprietary right.136 In many instances, the directors 
appointed by the shareholders are the representatives of the shareholders. If the board 
of directors were to remove from offi  ce one of these shareholder representatives, this 
would result in the shareholder control over the board of directors being attenuated, 
and would further shift the balance of power between the board of directors and the 
shareholders.
It is submitted that the removal of a shareholder representative from the 
board of directors by the directors would have an eff ect on the balance of power 
not only between the board of directors and the shareholders, but also between the 
shareholders themselves. For instance, if the board of directors removes from offi  ce 
a director who is a representative of the minority shareholders, this would shift the 
equilibrium between the majority and minority representatives on the board137 and 
consequently between the majority and minority shareholders.
This possible power shift is further exacerbated by the fact that directors have 
the right to fi ll vacancies on the board of directors.138 If a vacancy arises on the board 
of directors, it must be fi lled by a new appointment if the director had been appointed 
by a person named or determined in terms of the Memorandum of Incorporation,139 or 
by a new election.140 The new election must be conducted at the next annual general 
meeting of the company (if applicable); or in any other case, within six months after 
the vacancy arose, at a shareholders’ meeting called for the purpose of electing a 
director; or by a written polling of the shareholders who are entitled to vote in the 
election of that director.141 In terms of section 68(3) of the Companies Act, unless the 
Memorandum of Incorporation of a profi t company provides otherwise, the board 
of directors is empowered to appoint a person – who satisfi es the requirements for 
election as a director – to fi ll a vacancy on the board and to serve as a director of the 
company on a temporary basis until the vacancy has been fi lled by election. During 
this temporary period, the director so appointed has all the powers, functions and 
duties and is subject to all the liabilities of any other director of the company.142
The board of directors of a profi t company may remove a minority shareholder 
representative from the board and fi ll the vacancy, albeit on a temporary basis, 
with a director whom they favour. As the court in the US case of Bruch v National 
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Guarantee Credit Corp143 stated, the “law does not look with disfavor on the policy of 
securing to minority stockholders a right of representation on the board of directors”. 
Accordingly, as stated above, the power granted to directors to fi ll vacancies on 
the board of directors has an impact not only on the balance of power between the 
directors and the shareholders, but also on the balance of power between the majority 
and minority shareholders.
5   2 Impact on the board of directors
It is submitted that the board’s power of removal of directors also has an impact 
on the dynamics of the board of directors itself. Such power may have the eff ect of 
inhibiting or hindering free and open discussion and debate in board meetings. A 
director may hesitate to express a dissenting opinion at a board meeting for fear of 
removal by his or her peers, or a dissident director may simply toe the line in order 
to preserve his or her position on the board. If directors fail to engage in discussion 
and debate in board meetings, or fail to question decisions to be made with regard to 
the company for fear of removal, this would negatively impact on the company and 
on the shareholders. A concern of removal may also create an environment where 
directors are so intimidated by the risks of removal that they feel stifl ed and thus 
refrain from taking high-risk (but potentially profi table) decisions, or from making 
long-term strategic decisions that would enhance the value of the company but would 
not necessarily result in an immediate return of profi t.144
Directors have a fi duciary duty to observe good faith towards the company, and 
in discharging that duty they must exercise an independent and unfettered judgement, 
and make decisions with the best interests of the company in mind.145 Should 
directors simply toe the line for fear of removal and so fail to express controversial 
or dissenting opinions, they could be in breach of these fi duciary duties.
Knight argues that, while a fear of removal is an important concern, directors 
are not likely to remain on a board without attempting to contribute to board 
deliberations, on account of their fi duciary duty to act in the best interests of the 
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company.146 He further contends that there exists little incentive for the directors who 
form a majority on a particular issue to rid themselves of a minority director when 
that director is not in a position to obstruct the workings of the board or to frustrate 
the will of the majority of the directors.147
Nevertheless, in the instances where the Memorandum of Incorporation of a 
company requires board decisions to be unanimous, the concern of removal may 
well result in a minority director hesitating to express a dissenting or controversial 
opinion. While it is conceded that not all decisions taken by the board of directors 
would require unanimity and that the board of directors is not likely to remove a 
minority director for expressing a dissenting opinion or for voting against the 
majority view, the fear of dismissal may nevertheless result in a minority director 
hesitating to express a contrary view or failing to attempt to convince the majority 
to change its view even in those circumstances where he or she believes that the 
majority view is not in the best interests of the company.
Knight further opines that disagreements in the boardroom would usually 
be resolved in the normal course of events by a board vote with all the directors 
abiding by the result, and by those directors who do not wish to be associated with 
the particular course of action agreed upon by the board, simply resigning from 
offi  ce.148 However, it is submitted that in many instances, for reasons of status, 
prestige or monetary rewards, a director would not be willing to resign from the 
board of directors if he or she does not wish to be associated with a particular course 
of action agreed upon by the board of directors. While resignation is a diffi  cult step 
to take for any director, it is an even more diffi  cult step for an executive director who 
is involved full-time in the day-to-day aff airs of the company.149 It is accordingly 
submitted that Knight’s suggestion of resignation would not in all instances be either 
practical or attractive.
The fear of removal from offi  ce may further result in a director failing to bring 
to the attention of the board of directors a suspicion or knowledge of wrong doing 
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by fellow directors. Of concern is that this power may not only be used by the board 
of directors subjectively – and not objectively – but also with ulterior motives. Both 
of these concerns are illustrated in the UK case of Lee v Chou Wen Hsien.150 The 
appellant, Lee, had become suspicious about certain perceived wrongdoings by the 
chairperson and managing director of the company. His requests for access to various 
accounts were denied. When he requested that a board meeting be convened so that 
he could discuss his suspicions and concerns with the board of directors, he received 
a notice signed by all his co-directors requesting him to resign immediately. In terms 
of the company’s constitution, the eff ect of such a notice was that the offi  ce of the 
director in question had to be vacated immediately. The appellant was consequently 
removed from the board of directors. Even though the Privy Council found that the 
board of directors had acted with ulterior motives in removing the appellant from 
the board of directors, it nevertheless held that the removal was valid.151 In essence, 
the Privy Council held that, in order to avoid uncertainty in the management of the 
company pending the resolution of the dispute, it was necessary to hold that bad faith 
on the part of any one director in removing a fellow board member would not vitiate 
the removal and would not retain in offi  ce the director whose removal was sought.152
It is imperative that the board of directors does not abuse its power to remove a 
director from offi  ce. In the US case of Bruch v National Guarantee Credit Corp,153 the 
Delaware Court of Chancery was not in favour of granting directors a right to remove a 
director from offi  ce. The general manager of the company had complained to the board 
of directors that the director in question had been guilty of embezzlement. Without 
giving the particular director an opportunity to be heard, the board passed a resolution 
removing him from offi  ce. At the trial, the director in question denied all charges of 
embezzlement. The court held that the various powers exercisable by a corporation are 
distributed among the directors, offi  cers and shareholders.154 The power to remove a 
director rests with the shareholders and not with the board of directors.155 In overturning 
the removal of the director in question, the court stated that:
To allow directors to frame charges against one of their fellows and then to try and expel 
him, would open the door to possibilities of fraud which designing men might use to wrest 
control of corporate aff airs from the stockholders, or their sympathetic representatives on the 
board, and transfer it to those who might seek to grasp the corporation for their own ends.156
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It is clear that there must be eff ective safeguards against the abuse of power by 
the board of directors to remove a fellow director from offi  ce. If there are eff ective 
checks and balances, the potential for such abuse of power may be contained.
6 Maintaining the balance of powers with regard to the 
removal of directors from offi  ce
Section 5(1) of the Companies Act states that the same Act must be interpreted and 
applied in a manner that gives eff ect to the purposes set out in section 7. In Nedbank 
Ltd v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd; Essa v Bestvest 153 (Pty) Ltd,157 Gamble J stated that 
the eff ect of section 7 of the Companies Act is that courts are now required to adopt 
a “fresh approach” when assessing the aff airs of corporate entities in South Africa. 
The court further stated that the legislature has pertinently charged the courts with 
the duty to interpret the Companies Act in such a way that the founding values of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 are respected and advanced, 
and further, so that the spirit and purpose of the Companies Act are given eff ect to.158
The court also emphasised that one of the purposes of the Companies Act is to 
balance the rights and obligations of shareholders and directors within companies.159 
This purpose is contained in section 7(i) of the Companies Act. It is patent from 
the above discussion that the statutory conferment on the board of directors of 
the power of removal of a director has shifted the balance of powers between the 
shareholders and the directors. This shift in the balance is more pronounced in 
light of section 66(1) of the Companies Act, which confers original power on the 
board of directors and results in the board being subject to shareholder control to a 
lesser extent than hitherto.160 Arguably, from the director’s point of view, the current 
position under the Companies Act is a preferable “balance”, because the power of 
the directors has been enhanced. This is not necessarily so from the point of view 
of the shareholders, because their control over the directors has been reduced. It 
is important for the rights and obligations of the directors and shareholders to be 
properly balanced so that directors do not abuse their powers and do not neglect the 
interests of the shareholders. The balance of powers between the shareholders and 
directors is furthermore crucial so that the shareholders are able to act as an eff ective 
counterbalance to the powerful directors.161
The question arises whether it is possible to maintain the balance of powers 
between the directors and the shareholders. It is submitted that, in light of the 
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redistribution of the power between the shareholders and the directors, it is not 
possible to maintain the power between these organs in the manner that had existed 
prior to the conferment of the power of removal on the board of directors. The mere 
conferral of the power of removal on the board of directors, even if such power is not 
used, impacts on the balance of power between the directors and the shareholders, 
and on the dynamics between them, because the threat of the power of removal is 
ever present.
Nevertheless, even if the balance of power between the directors and the 
shareholders can no longer be maintained to the same extent as prior to the conferment 
of the power of removal on the board of directors, it is submitted that the proper 
balance sought by section 7(i) of the Companies Act could perhaps be achieved if the 
board of directors gives due consideration to the following factors before deciding 
whether to remove a fellow board member from offi  ce:
 ● The concept of corporate democracy and the inherent rights of shareholders 
to appoint and remove a director. Before removing a fellow director from 
offi  ce, the board should consider whether the inherent rights of shareholders to 
remove directors should be honoured, or whether they should be disregarded, 
particularly where the director in question was appointed by the shareholders 
and not by the board of directors.
 ● Whether a fellow director whom the board of directors wishes to remove is a 
representative of the minority shareholders, and if so, the impact of such removal 
on the dynamics between the majority and minority shareholders.
 ● Whether in removing a director from offi  ce, the board of directors would be 
breaching its fi duciary duties or acting with ulterior motives.
 ● Whether the board of directors is acting openly and transparently at all times 
and in the best interests of the company when removing a director from offi  ce.
The last two factors mentioned above would in any event have to be complied 
with by the board of directors in removing a fellow board member from offi  ce. 
Yet, as illustrated in the UK case of Lee v Chou Wen Hsien,162 boards of directors 
do sometimes act with ulterior motives in removing a director from offi  ce and do 
not necessarily always act openly and transparently and in the best interests of the 
company when doing so. It is evident from that case163 that even where the directors 
are in breach of their fi duciary duties when removing a director or where they remove 
a director with ulterior motives, a court may nevertheless affi  rm the board’s decision 
and refuse to reinstate the improperly removed director.
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7 Conclusion
This article traces the historical division of powers between the board of directors and 
the shareholders. It further examines the underpinning philosophy of the removal of 
directors from offi  ce. The matter of separation of ownership and control, as famously 
documented by Berle and Means in 1932,164 is examined and the consequences of the 
split between ownership and control are canvassed. This article further explores the 
rationale for conferring the power of removal of directors on shareholders. It is argued 
that, in light of the eff ects of the separation of power and control in a company, the 
power conferred on shareholders to remove directors from offi  ce strikes a balance 
between the attenuated power of control of shareholders with the power of directors 
to manage the company. It is further argued that the shareholders’ power of removal 
is a critical tool in the hands of shareholders: it is a form of corporate democracy and 
a necessary and key provision of modern company law.
The enactment of section 71(3) of the Companies Act, conferring power on the 
board of directors to remove another director from offi  ce, has now fundamentally 
shifted the historical balance of power between the board of directors and 
shareholders, between the shareholders themselves and even among the board of 
directors themselves. Despite the merits of conferring the power of removal on the 
board of directors, such conferment is not consistent with the original rationale for 
giving shareholders the right to remove directors, that is, to give shareholders more 
power over directors. This is because the separation of ownership and control has 
resulted in attenuated shareholder control. In an attempt to achieve the proper balance 
between directors and shareholders, as required by section 7(i) of the Companies 
Act, to guard against directors abusing their powers and furthermore neglecting the 
interests of the shareholders, this article makes certain suggestions with regard to 
containing the redistribution of power between the directors and the shareholders.
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